What can be said, according to Wittgenstein, are only things that are within logical space. This is to say that only things that can claim a connection about things in the world, which can be true or false, are able to be expressed in language. The rest is in the realm of showing.
Showing consists of expressing a judgement or position in relation to something that can be expressed in language. For example, the claim “the apple is red” can be said, while the thought that red apples are the best kind of apple can only be shown.
There is a question, however, as to if it is possible to show with language. To put it another way it is to ask if language can perform other functions besides simply conveying propositional content (something of the kind that can be true or false). I believe that language can.
Language is not something that simply presents propositions as being true (then such a claim can be judged to be the case or not) but it presents propositions in a certain way. The context in which truth claims are made and the tone in which they are made gives language a further dimension than just saying.
One way that language can be used to show is that it can use propositional content as a means to another end, that is, language can use propositional content indirectly. For example, I can say that “it is raining” and by the simply pointing out of this fact show that I either approve or disapprove of it raining. The point of the linguistic act of saying “it is raining” is not to make a claim as to the truth of the proposition that it is raining. Instead, it is drawing attention to my relationship to the proposition that it is raining.
It may possible to go even beyond this. Let us again consider the sentence “the apple is red.” The mere fact of uttering this sentence might very well show my relationship to the proposition red apple. It is also, however, possible that in saying such a sentence that I can show how others besides myself stand in relationship to the proposition red apple.
An example of this is, in saying “the apple is red,” I am bringing to the attention of a child who likes red things that the apple is also red and thus the child should so like the apple (perhaps in order to get the child to eat the apple it is refusing to eat). I can thus invite others to stand in a certain relationship to a proposition by the use of language.
An interesting point here is if one is, in showing, able to give an imperative that one should stand in a certain relationship to a proposition — that is, do more than invite or suggest. Is language still showing when I say that it is wrong to murder, with the natural implication of it being wrong for all persons through all time.
Interesting. Do you have a reference or title for the Wittgenstein points?